Cyber-security: The digital arms trade | The Economist # It’s shit like this which will hurt Full Disclosure

IT IS a type of software sometimes described as “absolute power” or “God”. Small wonder its sales are growing. Packets of computer code, known as “exploits”, allow hackers to infiltrate or even control computers running software in which a design flaw, called a “vulnerability”, has been discovered. Criminal and, to a lesser extent, terror groups purchase exploits on more than two dozen illicit online forums or through at least a dozen clandestine brokers, says Venkatramana Subrahmanian, a University of Maryland expert in these black markets. He likens the transactions to “selling a gun to a criminal”.

Just a dozen years ago the buying and selling of illicit exploits was so rare that India’s Central Bureau of Investigation had not yet identified any criminal syndicates involved in the trade, says R.K. Raghavan, a former director of the bureau. Underground markets are now widespread, he says. Exploits empower criminals to steal data and money. Worse still, they provide cyber-firepower to hostile governments that would otherwise lack the expertise to attack an advanced country’s computer systems, worries Colonel John Adams, head of the Marine Corps’ Intelligence Integration Division in Quantico, Virginia.

via Cyber-security: The digital arms trade | The Economist.

“It’s like selling guns to criminals” – where have I heard something like that before?

Oh yes, here:

[…] people can now crack a system, using “crack“, without even being decent programmers. There is no rite-of-passage for these people, they may not even realize that there are laws which could stick them in jail for years.

Someone once broke into another system which I control, I discovered it, tracked them down, and they got fired. For what? This person wasn’t even a good programmer–they didn’t even know they could be traced. I didn’t feel very good about this firing–didn’t want them to be fired–I just wanted to stop them from breaking into my system. When I discussed this case with CERT, I made it clear that I didn’t want the perpetrators arrested since they did no damage, I just wanted them to stop. However, under present US law they committed a felony. Frankly, it did waste about $500 of my time. The CERT people tried to assuage my feelings: at least they didn’t get thrown in jail, because you didn’t press charges, they said.

A publically available raw “crack” is somewhat like throwing a pile of guns into a day care center. There isn’t even a “safety” on crack.

I want to make it clear that I am not trying to impose some sort of mandate onto the developers of “crack”. They have the right to produce and distribute whatever software they choose.

Instead, I am appealing to them to produce a piece of software which errs more on the side of usefulness than destructiveness.

That was in 1992, and the discussion continues at that link; and here we are again with sploitz and vulnz and 0days, oh my…

Sigh.

Some muppet is going to get their hands on the article and convince Governments to waste money on them, just wait and see; and attempts at “regulation” will follow.

Comments

3 responses to “Cyber-security: The digital arms trade | The Economist # It’s shit like this which will hurt Full Disclosure”

  1. Like selling a gun to a criminal, eh?

    I dunno what your position on the right to bear arms is, Alec…but welcome to the kind of bullshit and demagoguery gun-rights advocates have to cope with all the time.

  2. Maybe that Muppet needs to be Moffet 🙂 . I mean who better to do it than the guy who sold guns in the 90’s :). [Tongue completely in cheek.]

  3. Dio

    It falls into the hands and on the shoulders of the beholder. nmap, iPerf, and JackRipper, are beautiful classic tools for network and system diagnosis and eventual protection. In the hands of an antagonist, these tools become annoyances. In the hands of a terrorist, they become munitions. Firearms are no different. As we fall further and further into the slavery of automation, greater and greater losses will be realized with simpler and simpler tools. A DOS against an automated mass transit system would be a frightening experience. A biomedical device with an embedded stuxnet compromise doesn’t sound like a good time either. Analog devices while crude, are less at the mercy(nor control) of a coordinated attack.

    Yes, I know, you can always make the claim that we should embed good code into the bad code so that the good code won’t let the bad code to anything…evil. But as systems become more complicated, the ROI for having such complicated code makes it untenable to vet accurately, and as sloppiness/apathy/etc set in and we have a catastrophic vulnerability.

    Just because science fiction books were written about such scenarios doesn’t mean they can’t happen in meat space.

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