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End-to-End Encryption and Client-Side Scanning: Notes for @CameronWilson of Crikey magazine; relevant also to #OnlineSafetyBill
Cam Wilson messaged me asking for some commentary on regulation proposals in Australia; this text is what I sent; 2+ articles have been written since, but they are all paywalled I worked on internet security & privacy for over 30 years, and now I’ve chucked work to raise a family, so with a 2yo daughter
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A short note for Civil Society on the inadvisability of Government regulation & restriction of #LLM and #AI — #OpenSource #FreeSpeech #CodeIsSpeech
So there’s an interesting Reddit post which leads to an article on VentureBeat and a letter from a Senator to Mark Zuckerberg, all attached below. There’s a fairly straightforward point which needs to be made:
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End to End Encryption: Political Timing is Everything / HT: @radioproducer
I am in a brief period between nappy changes for the toddler, so I will have to make this really concise because that situation could change at any moment so I’ll try a bullet-point-list format: So where are we now? As far as I am aware the Messenger Encryption features are all being enabled and
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NEW: “LockAndCode” Podcast on #AgeVerification by @Malwarebytes, featuring @AlecMuffett: “Identity crisis: How an anti-porn crusade could jam the Internet”
I was delighted to be invited back to the LockAndCode podcast to speak about American lawmakers discovering “Age Verification,” comparing it to similar experiences in the UK: There are some links in the podcast show notes, but I’ll attach below the extended set of links which I originally built to help David & the team,
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A question for everyone who is saying that #AI must be regulated (a) soon, and (b) by the Government rather than self-regulation; #BigAI
There are a bunch of people who are opining off-of the attached tweet; critical opinions generally can be characterised along the lines of: the tech industry cannot police itself / look at the history of social media / facebook was bad, this will be worse / the internet is bad / imagine if airlines ran
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A Short Thread on peoples’ understanding of “End-to-End Encryption”
Unrolled Hi Colm! I can't remember seeing—at any time in my experience of end-to-end encryption since 1991—anyone using the term do describe the "hop-at-a-time" process that you describe below. So, in a short thread? I'll attach a few resources to help everyone. Firstly, heres my video on the Duck Test for End-to-End Secure Messaging Secondly,
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High Performers of Low Trust #tiktok #funny #wellilaughed
Try to avoid working with people you can identify via this one weird trick:
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ICYMI: @LordJimKnight (who has abandoned Twitter) proposes in the #OnlineSafetyBill that platforms must know the nationality and/or physical location of their users, lest VPNs (etc) are used to circumvent OSB restrictions
This proposal is misconceived, illiberal and practically totalitarian; the Internet is not designed with the concept that data (i.e. speech) has a nationality, and therefore the obligation would be on platforms to obtain and maintain nationality or physical location of their users (rather than utilise communications metadata) in order to hamper people who might use
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A short thread on implementing properly private end-to-end encrypted messaging on your global megaplatform
Alec’s Response Quite; when building FB Messenger “Secret Conversations” in 2015/16, our analogous thinking was: 0/5) app-only 1) privacy precludes visibility 2) compensate with better report flows 3) fix cards mañana with local rendering 4) photo re-encoding is a thing 5) webclient will be hard re: Web-Client, there were more significant architectural issues with in-browser
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Resource for Journalists: How best to frame your article criticising @ElonMusk for adding #Encryption to @Twitter DMs. Questions to ask, resources to consult.
Note: this is a “living” document. Check back for updates.Last updated: 5 May 2023 around 0800h London time. Hi! Thank you for reading this! If you’re a journalist and you’re going to write something about Twitter adopting Encryption for Twitter Direct Messages, it’s really easy to adopt the frame that: “Elon is doing it, so
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Re: #OnlineSecurityBill & #ChatControl demands to filter WhatsApp messages for content legality, one must wonder if the UK & EU Governments would be content to extend such features to northern Nigerian or Uganda? #ChatKontrolle #LGBT
I have a family link to northern Nigeria[1] and so my interest is always piqued when I see it come up for discussion — so then I see it mentioned in parliament by Jim Shannon in the context of privacy & safety: I will come to the horrific case raised by Theresa Villiers. On 12
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#Facepalm — what we really don’t need right now is somebody trying to reboot failed 1997 #Encryption Key Escrow, e.g. like in this letter to the @FT #OnlineSafetyBill
This is disappointing, misconceived, and woefully repetitious of some nonsense which we last (?) saw back in 1996/ish when secret-sharing was still relatively new, cool & trendy. In case you’re not familiar: this proposal (a) will not scale to meet demand nor growth (b) is in any case an illiberal imposition, (c) breaks Ranum’s Law