Oh this is good:

In seeking to raise the threshold for menacing, Cooper relies heavily on a 1968 case R v Clear, in which Sellers LJ makes the following statement:

Words or conduct which would not intimidate or influence anyone to respond to the demand would not be menaces … but threats and conduct of such a nature and such an extent that the mind of an ordinary person of normal stability and courage might be influenced or made apprehensive so as to accede unwilling to the demand would be sufficient for a jury’s consideration. [R v Clear [1968] 1 QB 670 at 679 to 680, 52 Cr App R 58 at 69]

Cooper uses this to argue that in order for a threat to be menacing, it must be a credible one. In other words there must be good reason to believe that the threat will be carried out. This is crucial, as all throughout the handling of the situation at Robin Hood Airport Paul’s tweet was classed a non-credible threat.

Well done chaps, I really hope this prevails…