The latest spin on the Home Office demand for a backdoor into Apple iCloud/iMessage storage is “…it’s not a backdoor, we just want existing exploitable weaknesses to NOT be removed”

Read the attached, and consider that the existing access mechanisms would ALSO remain available to malicious actors.

They don’t want the architectural security holes to be bricked-up. It’s a bit like they fear that Apple & Meta are building on some sort of surveillance green-belt.

Quote RecordedFuture’s Alexander Martin:


But my frustration with the phrase “back door” is how it misrepresents the British government’s intention. That intention is explicitly and intentionally to not create some kind of covert Top Secret capability to access encrypted data […] and to not do so because such a weakness could be abused by malicious actors. Instead, the point of TCNs is just to ensure that existing access methods remain available … as they were with iCloud up until November 2022.

Full article/argument/appeal, at LinkedIn

Fediverse reactions

Comments

One response to “The latest spin on the Home Office demand for a backdoor into Apple iCloud/iMessage storage is “…it’s not a backdoor, we just want existing exploitable weaknesses to NOT be removed””

  1. Wow, perhaps unsurprisingly Alex blocked me.

    Alexander Martin: No, that is not what I’m saying. I’ve learned not to engage with you Alec. I would encourage others to do the same.

    Alec Muffett: it is literally what you are saying, Alex; you may not frame it that way but the weaknesses which are inherent in the old pre-2022 way of doing things, are available to all the bad guys as well. You are demanding that nothing should improve.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *